FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES:
WHAT COLLECTIVE INTENTION TELLS US
ABOUT CONGRESS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

ABBY WRIGHT

†

INTRODUCTION
While courts in the United States frequently invoke legislative in1
tent and legislative purpose when interpreting statutes, legal scholars
have long questioned whether a multimember body like Congress can
have purposes or intentions. Drawing on the philosophical literature
on collective intention, this Comment argues that Congress, when enacting statutes, is the type of social organization that has intentions.
The same literature on collective intention, however, counsels caution
in expanding the list of mental states one should ascribe to Congress.
This Comment begins by defining the contours of legislative intent and legislative purpose and then explore why relying on legislative purpose is appealing to courts. Next, the Comment describes a
variety of theories of collective intention and looks in depth at the
work of Raimo Tuomela. Third, the Comment analyzes Congress’s
characteristics as a social entity and applies Tuomela’s account of collective intention to Congress, concluding that this account demonstrates that Congress, at least under certain circumstances, can have
intentions. The argument runs as follows: to be a member of Congress an individual must agree that when legislation is being written,
amended, and voted on certain members of Congress will become
“operative” members. Once a bill is passed, all members of Congress
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have an obligation to accept, at least weakly, that text as the group’s
intention; the minority members of Congress have agreed to “give up
their will with respect to group-binding group-goal formation [in this
instance the text of the statute that was passed] and transfer that right
2
to the operative members.”
Finally, this Comment argues that while legislative purpose is an
appealing tool for determining the scope of statutes, analyses using
“legislative purpose” are misguided because the uniqueness and complexity of Congress as a social group limits the application of theories
3
of collective intention. Members of Congress cannot be said to have
agreed in advance to accept the larger purposes and hopes that various members of Congress might possess when enacting legislation.
Therefore, when a judge purports to base a decision on legislative
purpose, if the decision is to be justified, it must be supported by considerations extrinsic to the legislative process and any theory of collective intention.
I. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PURPOSE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Hibbs and Allapattah
In the 2003 Term, a divided Supreme Court decided Hibbs v.
4
Winn, bringing the hotly contested concepts of legislative intent and
legislative purpose to the fore. The respondents in Hibbs challenged
an Arizona law that provided a tax credit for contributions to organizations awarding scholarships to children attending private, and pos5
sibly religious, schools. The issue before the Court was whether the
6
Tax Injunction Act (TIA) prohibited a suit to enjoin a state tax credit
7
of this kind. The TIA states that “district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in

2

RAIMO TUOMELA, THE IMPORTANCE OF US: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF BASIC
SOCIAL NOTIONS 279 (1995).
3
See infra note 177 and accompanying text (describing Congress as a group with a
“complex and detailed division and specialization of labor”); infra Part IV.F (arguing
that Congress has collective intention only to the point that “nonoperative members
have some obligation to at least weakly accept the operative members’ jointly accepted
intention”).
4
542 U.S. 88 (2004).
5
Id. at 94-95.
6
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
7
Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93.
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8

the courts of such State.” The majority ultimately determined that
the TIA did not bar such a suit because neither the word assessment
nor the statute’s underlying purpose prohibited a suit where the repeal of the tax would increase the state’s finances.
The Court began its analysis with a somewhat strained study of the
language of the statute and determined that the term assessment has a
9
“collection-propelling function.” Thus, according to the majority, a
lessening of state tax burdens would not fall under the TIA’s terms
because it would not be an assessment, levy, or collection of tax. Crucially, however, the Court went on to analyze the purpose of the TIA,
10
concluding, in agreement with Judge Easterbrook, that § 1341’s purpose was to “restrain state taxpayers from instituting federal actions to
contest their liability for state taxes, but not to stop third parties from
pursuing constitutional challenges to tax benefits in a federal fo11
rum.”
Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, responded with a vigorous disagreement over the meaning of assessment as used in the TIA. He
stated that “an assessment . . . must at the least encompass the re12
cording of a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.” Thus, enjoining the
Arizona tax credit in question would affect the assessment of a state tax
because it would alter the amount of tax recorded for the taxpayer.
Justice Kennedy rejected the idea that the TIA’s purpose could have
an independent, interpretive life of its own, stating that “the scope
13
and purpose of the Act should be understood from its terms alone.”
Justice Kennedy further noted that an interpretation of the TIA as
prohibiting any interference with state tax schemes “accords with the
direct, broad, and unqualified language of the statute . . . . ‘[W]hen
terms are unambiguous we may not speculate on probabilities of in14
tention.’”
For Justice Kennedy, the words of the statute are what
should determine its application; the broader legislative purpose of a
statute should have no separate role in interpretation.

8

28 U.S.C. § 1341.
Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 102.
10
See Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The legislative history . . .
shows that § 1341 is designed to ensure that federal courts do not interfere with states’
collection of taxes, so long as the taxpayers have an opportunity to present to a court
federal defenses to the imposition and collection of the taxes.”).
11
Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 108.
12
Id. at 115 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
13
Id. at 114.
14
Id. at 126 (quoting Merchs’. Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. 541, 545 (1866)).
9
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While Justice Kennedy was in the minority in Hibbs, he wrote the
majority opinion for a similar statutory interpretation case, Exxon Mo15
bil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., decided quite recently. The Allapattah Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 “authorized supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by diverse parties arising out of the same
16
Article III case or controversy.” Justice Kennedy reaffirmed his belief
that “[e]xtrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only
to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s
17
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.” The debate between
majority and dissent, however, centered on the proper reading of the
18
statute and not the role of legislative history and legislative purpose.
19
Only Justice Stevens’ dissent invoked the statute’s legislative history;
the main dissenting opinion did “not rely on the measure’s legislative
20
history.” Thus, while Allapattah demonstrates the continuing debate
over techniques of statutory interpretation, the actual issue was not, as
in Hibbs, the validity of legislative purpose.
For the respondents in Hibbs and Allapattah, the 5-4 decisions
mean that one Justice’s theory of statutory interpretation determined
the success of their claim. These cases illustrate how divisive the debates over the use of legislative intent and legislative purpose have become. While, as in Hibbs and Allapattah, the Justices opposed to the
use of legislative purpose can be identified as the more conservative
members of the Court, conservative positions are not necessarily
aligned with a more restrictive understanding of statutory interpreta21
tion. Furthermore, Hibbs is but one example of a long line of cases

15

125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
Id. at 2625.
17
Id. at 2626.
18
See id. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (advocating a “narrower construction”
of § 1367 than that employed by the majority).
19
Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20
Id. at 2641 n.14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21
Compare Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents at 2, Massachusetts v.
EPA, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14311 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2005) (No. 03-1361) (opposing
broader regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and stating that the court should use
the Clean Air Act’s “text, its overall structure, and legislative history” in interpreting
the statute), with Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated Cases at 13, Massachusetts v. EPA, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14311 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2005) (No. 03-1361) (supporting regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and urging a reading of the Clean Air
Act’s “plain language” when determining the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse
gas emission standards).
16

2006]

987

COLLECTIVE INTENTION
22

where a majority has looked to legislative purpose to interpret a stat23
ute. The question remains, however, whether this use of legislative
purpose (and even legislative intent) in statutory interpretation is justifiable. Furthermore, the inquiry into whether such tools are justified
presupposes that legislatures have intents or purposes.
This Comment seeks to evaluate this claim: that the nature of
Congress as a social group is such that Congress has intents and purposes. Without a positive answer to this question, courts arguing from
legislative intent or legislative purpose would only be masking other
interpretive techniques (be they policy concerns, personal opinion,
etc.) when they claim to be relying on a legislature’s state of mind.
This Comment argues, based on theories of collective intention found
in the philosophical literature, that a judge or court can sensibly speak
of legislative intent in the narrow sense defined in Part II.A, but not of
legislative purpose. Being able to sensibly speak of legislative intent
does not mean that a judge or court is necessarily justified in relying
24
on legislative intent in statutory interpretation or that legislative intent is necessarily determinable in every case; this Comment seeks
only to answer the more limited question of whether Congress is the
type of social group that makes “legislative intent” possible.
B. The Debate over Legislative Intent
The use of legislative intent in statutory interpretation has long
been controversial. It has been attacked as impossible and unknow22

Although the Court in these cases sometimes uses the words “intend” or “intent," the reasoning fits this Comment’s definition of legislative purpose. See infra note
41.
23
See, e.g., Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582,
590 (1995) (“In concluding that Congress did not authorize damages actions in state
tax cases brought in federal court, we found no evidence that Congress intended §
1983 to overturn the principle of federalism invoked in Dows and subsequently followed by the courts.”); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989)
(“Our conclusion that a State is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983 is reinforced by Congress’ purpose in enacting the statute. . . . Congress, in passing § 1983,
had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity and to so alter
the federal-state balance . . . .”); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578 (1986)
(“A rule of proportionality would make it difficult . . . for individuals with meritorious
civil rights claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress from the
courts. This is totally inconsistent with Congress’ purpose in enacting § 1988.”);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979) (rejecting an interpretation
of Title VII that would prohibit all affirmative action programs as contrary to the purpose of the statute).
24
For example, one could still argue that legislative intent is irrelevant or undemocratic.
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26

able and, even if possible, irrelevant to the task of statutory interpretation. Much recent literature, however, has defended the use of
legislative intent in statutory interpretation. Some literature has
viewed questions of legislative intent in light of the nature of language
27
itself or the nature of our concepts about the actions of multi28
member organizations.
25

See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person,
fictive for a collective body.”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863
(1930), reprinted in LAW AND LANGUAGE 189, 196 (Frederick Shauer ed., 1993) (“A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two
or three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which
many of the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.”); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not. To pretend
otherwise is fanciful.”); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 16-21 (1994) (claiming not that legislative intent is never discoverable
or always irrelevant, but rather arguing that actual congressional intent is almost always
unknowable and conventional intent (i.e., what a given subgroup states is the intent of
the legislature) is equally unhelpful because of the presence of vote counting, strategic
behavior, and aggregation).
26
See, e.g., Radin, supra note 25, at 197-98 (arguing that even if the intention of the
legislature were determinable, it would be irrelevant for purposes of statutory interpretation because it does not bind current interpreters, given that the legislature cannot
be said to have performed the interpretation in advance).
27
See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?”:
Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 982 (2004)
(arguing that “recourse to intentions” is necessarily required for any interpretation of a
text and, indeed, to identify a series of marks on a page as a text); Lawrence M. Solan,
Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 434 (2005) (“[T]he distinction between the language of a statute
and the intent of the legislature is largely a false one.”); Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in
a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431, 440 (2001)
(“Virtually any linguist would agree that the goal of interpretation is to determine what
the . . . author intends to communicate to his audience.”).
28
See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Legislative Intent: Fact or Fabrication?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 1329, 1351-58 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994)) (citing John Searle, Margaret Gilbert, and Michael Bratman
for the proposition that legislative intent need not be the sum of individual intents in
order to attack Eskridge’s dismissal of legislative intent); Solan, supra note 27, at 438-40
(defending legislative intent with reference to the work of Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 259-64 (applying John Searle’s philosophy of collective intention to account for the institutional intention of Congress); cf. Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1503, 1514-27 (2000) (using Margaret Gilbert’s work on plural subjects to
argue that the democratic state is a collective agent); Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional
and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 283-84 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (claim-
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Although some of the literature supporting the use of legislative
intent has styled itself as a response to textualism, a more moderate
version of textualism need not exclude the use of legislative intent in
29
statutory interpretation. Textualists take the position that “statutory
30
text is the most determinate basis for statutory interpretation.” Even
though the text may be the central focus of the interpretive task for a
textualist, textualists arguably still recognize the role of legislative intent, but simply seek to limit evidence of intent almost entirely to the
31
text itself. Thus, the trend seems to be towards an acceptance of the
32
necessity of legislative intent, even if in a much reduced form.
Despite the recent warming to legislative intent, old doubts remain about the possibility of discerning intent when the intent in
question must emanate from a group of persons, especially a group
with as varied an array of aspirations, agendas, and motivations as
33
Congress. These concerns are even more amplified with respect to

ing that groups can have intents under certain conditions, but arguing that the real
question is “whether judges should take into account the attitudes of legislators”).
29
For a description of a very extreme form of textualism, see Alexander &
Prakash, supra note 27, at 968, calling the “insistence that intentions play no role in the
production of meaning . . . ‘intention free textualism.’” Justice Scalia, in a recent article, appears to approach this extreme. See Antonin Scalia, Law & Language, FIRST
THINGS, Nov. 2005, at 37, 43 (reviewing STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004))
(“Alice [in Wonderland] and I believe that words, like other conventional symbols, do
convey meaning, an objective meaning, regardless of what their author ‘intends’ them
to mean . . . .”).
30
ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 38.
31
See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 127 (1999) (“To be more exact, textualism claims that it does try to discover the intent of the legislature, but limits this inquiry to the text of the statute itself.”). Tiersma elsewhere states that “[e]veryone
should be a textualist sometimes,” arguing that limiting the interpretive task to the text
may be appropriate for highly ‘autonomous’ legal texts. Tiersma, supra note 27, at
482.
32
Even “strict” textualists and those who apparently reject legislative intent as undemocratic or ontologically impossible rely on at least a restricted view of intention.
For example, Justice Holmes wrote that “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature
meant; we ask only what the statute means,” but earlier in the essay he had expressed
that “we inquire what he meant in order to find out what he has said.” Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899), reprinted in LAW
AND LANGUAGE, supra note 25, at 185, 186-87. While Judge Easterbrook has been, at
times, skeptical of the existence of congressional intent, he seems to accept a kind of
legislative intent which “informs a reading of a text, tells us its meaning.” Easterbrook,
supra note 25, at 64; see also Solan, supra note 27, at 453-58 (discussing examples from
judicial opinions in which textualists resorted to using terms related to the intent of
the legislature).
33
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 16 (“That most members of Congress voted for a
bill tells us little about what most members of Congress actually thought . . . . Problems
with identifying the actual intent of individual legislators become overwhelming when
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using legislative purpose to determine the meaning of a statute because
legislative purpose requires inferences even further removed from the
text of the statute. Thus, this Comment examines both legislative intent and legislative purpose in light of Congress’s nature as a social
group.
C. The Argument
As described above, serious doubts about the existence of legislative intent remain, despite a close to universal reliance on authorial
34
intent to at least some degree in the interpretation of statutes. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court frequently resorts to discussions
of legislative purpose in interpreting statutes, many scholars do not
believe legislative purpose is a justifiable technique of statutory inter35
pretation. Thus, the problem is the following: Does the nature of Congress as a social group combined with the properties of statutory text allow us to
make inferences about Congress’s intent? If so, does the same hold true for inferences about Congress’s purpose?
I argue that there is a plausible account of collective intention that
can be fruitfully applied to Congress. Although several recent legal
articles have drawn on philosophical theories of collective action and
36
intention, these articles have not examined the breadth of literature
available. Part II of this Comment defines the contours of legislative
intent and purpose and explores why reliance on legislative purpose is
so appealing. Part III lays out the scope of theories on collective action and intention. Part IV argues that an account of collective intention that recognizes the complex structure of an organization in
which certain members are authorized to set group goals suitably tied
to the purpose of the group can plausibly support inferences regarding Congress’s intent. I further argue, however, that Congress cannot
fulfill the requirements of a supraindividualist account of collective
intention or an account that requires every participant to espouse the
requisite intention. The last section of Part IV further argues that
while theories of collective intention demonstrate that ascertaining
legislative intent is possible (at least in theory), the same cannot be

these hard-to-figure individual intentions must be aggregated for each legislative
chamber . . . .”); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty
of knowing Congress’s intent).
34
See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
35
See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
36
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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said of legislative purpose. Thus, when a judge purports to base a decision on legislative purpose, this decision must, in fact, be supported
by considerations extrinsic to the legislative process and any inferences that might be drawn therefrom.
II. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
A. Legislative Intent and Legislative Purpose
Many scholars discuss two kinds of intent, distinguishing between
37
either intended meaning and intended goals or specific intent and
38
purpose. Other scholars and judges fail to delineate the contours of
legislative intent at all. While the distinction between intent and purpose is by no means crystal clear, I take legislative intent to mean the
narrow intent an author has when writing a text: what message she
hopes to communicate via the words chosen. This view of intention
makes use of what cognitive linguists have recognized as the conduit
39
metaphor. The source domain, which is the primary field of realworld experience from which the metaphor is drawn, is the world of
physical objects that can be transferred between individuals; the target
domain, the domain explained by the metaphor, is the world of men40
tal operations. In the conduit metaphor, words are the vehicles that
transfer ideas between individuals. The speaker places ideas into the
words, while the hearer extracts the ideas from the words received.
Thus, a legislator’s intent, in my sense, is the idea she sought to trans-

37

See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 27, app. at 994-95 (distinguishing
“what to say to convey what one means” from “what that meaning would accomplish”).
38
See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 26 (“[A]n inquiry into legislative purpose is
set at a higher level of generality than an inquiry into specific intentions . . . .”);
Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 288 (“A crucial question about any approach to the
meaning of a statute is how much weight to give to purposes, as contrasted with the
language of particular provisions and indications of specific intent.”).
39
See generally Michael J. Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor: A Case of Frame Conflict in
Our Language about Language, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 164 (Andrew Ortoney ed.,
2d ed. 1993) (analyzing the metaphor and providing an appendix with 141 examples
of sentences using the metaphor); see also STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE
FOREST: LAW, LIFE AND MIND 52-53 (2001) (describing and mapping the metaphorical
structure).
40
See WINTER, supra note 39, at 52-53 (“In this conceptual mapping, a concept or
idea is understood as an object subject to inspection, physical manipulation, and
transportation . . . .”).
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fer using the words she chose to speak. In some ways, then, my defini41
tion of legislative intent is rather limited.
Legislative purpose, on the other hand, I take to mean what a legislator imagines or hopes will change about the world by means of en42
acting the legislation. This statement is not free from complication.
Because the act of passing legislation changes something about the
43
world and is a performative utterance, I mean legislative purpose to
be something more than what Congress intends the direct effect of
the legislation to be. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) awards fees to
attorneys in civil rights cases. Legislative intent, what Congress sought
to communicate, would be the direct result that attorneys be awarded
fees if representing a prevailing party. In contrast, legislative purpose
might be to increase the number of attorneys willing to take civil
rights cases. Thus, legislative purpose is a secondary effect the statute
seeks to bring about.
Both legislative intent and legislative purpose in my sense are distinguishable from what Judge Easterbrook has called “raw intent”—
that is, intent without any law, meaning that a “law” could be enforced
if it comported with a legislative purpose that had no instantiation in
44
an actual statute. This is, however, no longer a serious contender as
45
an interpretive theory.
Like the debate over legislative intent, scholars disagree over
whether legislative purpose may be taken into account during statu46
tory interpretation.
Many scholars argue that legislative purpose

41

What evidence one may use to determine what meaning the legislators hoped
the words would carry is a separate question, and one this Comment does not try to
answer.
42
This is similar to a distinction made in Sinclair, supra note 28, at 1356.
43
See infra note 182 and accompanying text (arguing that the structure of a statute, combined with the words chosen by its authors, is a speech act that has a “performative” impact on its subjects).
44
Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 64-65.
45
The Supreme Court stated unanimously in P.R. Department of Consumer Affairs v.
Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501 (1988), that “unenacted approvals, beliefs, and
desires are not laws,” reversing the court of appeals. Thus, the lower court’s approval
of such an approach seems to be an outlier.
46
Compare HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1125 (1994) (“The first task in the
interpretation of any statute (or any provision of a statute) is to determine what purpose ought to
be attributed to it. The principal problem in the development of a workable technique
of interpretation is the formulation of . . . acceptable criteria for the attribution of
purpose.”), with Alexander & Prakash, supra note 27, app. at 994-95 (arguing in favor
of intentionalists who “only advocate[] honoring the intent of the lawmaker at the spe-
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should not be taken into account because it is too far removed from
47
the actual words enacted by the legislature, even though the Su48
49
preme Court still embraces legislative purpose quite frequently.
B. Why Legislative Purpose Is Appealing
While it is not my goal to describe statutory construction itself in
any detail in this Comment, I would like to briefly describe why and
when the use of legislative purpose is particularly attractive. This supports the argument that it is crucial to determine whether a determination of legislative purpose, in addition to legislative intent, is possible.
First, it is important to understand the linguistic concepts involved
in creating and interpreting legislation. Statutory construction in
hard cases is an act of conceptual categorization. Linguists such as
Charles Fillmore and George Lakoff have spent decades analyzing the
conceptual structures that explain and motivate our use and understanding of language. Professor Fillmore’s analysis has taken the form
of frame semantics:
Frame semantics offers a particular way of looking at word meanings . . . . [T]he term ‘frame’ [means] . . . any system of concepts related
in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits . . . .
. . . [W]ords represent categorizations of experience, and each of
these categories is underlain by a motivating situation occurring against
a background of knowledge and experience. 50

cific level of generality that the lawmaker meant to convey, even if at that level it
thwarts the lawmaker’s more general intentions”).
47
Furthermore, the use of legislative purpose might be argued to be undemocratic since laws are passed by elected representatives, while purposes are most often
not part of the codified law. Thus, some have argued that if, but only if, laws were
handed down by a dictator, her purpose in passing such laws would be relevant. See
Holmes, supra note 32, at 187 (“If supreme power resided in the person of a despot
who would cut off your hand or your head if you went wrong, probably one would take
every available means to find out what was wanted.”).
48
Here I mean legislative purpose as I have described; as described supra note 22,
the Court sometimes labels this Congress’s intention. These intentions are purposes in
my sense: they are related to the goals and objectives a statute can be said to support.
49
See supra note 23 (pointing to decisions in which the Supreme Court relied on
congressional purpose).
50
Charles J. Fillmore, Frame Semantics, in LINGUISTICS IN THE MORNING CALM 111,
111-12 (Linguistic Soc’y of Korea ed., 1982). For the most recent work on frame semantics and a bibliography of works using the theory, see Framenet,
http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~framenet (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
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One example of work in cognitive linguistics relevant to statutory
51
interpretation is Professor Fillmore’s analysis of the term orphan.
Professor Fillmore argues that orphan must be analyzed against the
background of a culture in which children depend on their parents
for support. Thus, the category of orphan “does not have ‘built into it’
any specification of the age after which it is no longer relevant to
speak of somebody as an orphan”; rather, this is understood through
the background information, or frame, of relationships between par52
ents and children in a particular culture. In his analysis, Professor
Fillmore points to the old joke where a child on trial for murdering
his parents asks the court to be lenient because he is now an orphan.
Given the frame in which orphan is situated, a person cannot “orphan”
53
herself. As Professor Fillmore’s orphan example illustrates:
The descriptive framework . . . is one in which words . . . are seen as indexing semantic or cognitive categories which are themselves recognized
as participating in larger conceptual structures of some sort, all of this
made intelligible by knowing something about the kinds of settings or
contexts in which a community found a need to make such categories
54
available to its participants . . . .

Professor Lakoff’s analysis has described the meaning of concepts
55
in terms of radial categories. Radial categories are highly structured
conceptual groupings with prototypical, salient, or ideal members
forming the center of the category and more peripheral members be56
ing judged as members of the category to a lesser degree. Radial
categories have a complex internal structure with connections of dif57
ferent types existing between members of the category.
Reflecting on Lakoff’s and Fillmore’s linguistic analyses, two situations emerge where statutory construction seems to require legislative
(or rule-making) purpose. The first is when a judge must decide what

51

See Fillmore, supra note 50, at 118 (using the orphan example to demonstrate
“the complexity of fit between uses of [a] word and real world situations to be attributed to the details of the prototype background frame rather than to the details of the
word’s meaning”); see also WINTER, supra note 39, at 85-87 (discussing Fillmore’s analysis of bachelor).
52
Fillmore, supra note 50, at 118.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 119.
55
GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 68-135 (1987).
56
Id. at 65, 91.
57
See WINTER, supra note 39, at 89-92 (drawing on LAKOFF, supra note 55), for an
interesting discussion of the complexities of the category mother.
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the boundaries of a particular category are, in a context in which the
legislature or rule-making body clearly had no intent with respect to a
new object or event.
58
For example, in Mead Corp. v. United States the court had to determine whether a day planner fit within the category described by
Section 4820.10.20 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United
States: “[d]iaries, notebooks and address books, bound; memorandum
59
pads, letter pads and similar articles.” This was not, properly speaking, a debate that could be won by determining the “proper” meaning
of day planner. Rather it was a debate over the boundaries of the concepts diary and bound. In this case it would have been extremely useful
to know the purpose for which the category had been created: Why
did the agency exempt some materials from tariff?
This question mirrors Professor Fillmore’s statement of what is
necessary to understand the term orphan. Categories take on the
structure they do precisely because they relate to some goal or purpose of the language community: why “a community found a need to
60
make such categories available to its participants.”
In terms of radial categories, the agency’s purpose would tell us
whether day planners should be within the radial category whose central or prototypical member is diary. The purpose the agency had in
enacting the tariff could alert a court to the inner structure of the
category and whether that structure extends the categories to include
day planners. The agency’s purpose would in this way tell a court why
the members of the category have been placed in the category—that
is, what internal structure holds them together? Thus, it is only natural to turn to the purpose of the legislation (or, as in this case, the
rule-making agency) as a guide to determining whether a particular
object or event falls within a given category.
The second situation where Lakoff’s and Fillmore’s work provides
insight is one in which two possible categorizations of a concept conflict. Such was the case in determining the meaning of enterprise in National Organization for Women v. Scheidler; the Court had to determine if
an antiabortion group was an enterprise as defined by the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) in order to deter61
mine whether the group could be liable for its activities. The Court
58

185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), rev’d in part, United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001).
59
Id. at 1306-10 (emphasis added).
60
Fillmore, supra note 50, at 119.
61
510 U.S. 249, 250, 256-61 (1994).
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did not require an enterprise to have an economic purpose and, thus,
held that Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) could, in theory, be an en62
terprise for purposes of RICO.
Following the case, three linguists and a law professor devised an
experiment to determine whether the Court’s interpretation matched
63
that of English speakers. This experiment revealed two groups of
speakers: those who required an enterprise to have a profit-seeking or
economic goal and those who only required some sort of organiza64
tional goal. These two conceptualizations of enterprise correspond to
the debate in the courts; understanding more about the purposes of
those who enacted RICO would shed light on which categorization
should be selected and, more specifically, given Congress’s purpose in
enacting RICO, whether PLAN should fit within the category of enterprise.
As has been demonstrated, using legislative purpose to determine
the scope of a regulation or statute is highly appealing in difficult
cases that require an extension of a concept or a choice between two
competing conceptualizations. The question remains, however,
whether the use of legislative purpose can ever be justified given the
problems of ascribing purpose to multi-member organizations such as
Congress.
III. THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE INTENTION

65

“In the last decade, philosophy has seen a burgeoning interest in
the social world—in the nature of social relations, social entities, and
66
sociality itself.” Consistent with this expanding analysis of the social
world, this Part describes the most significant work in the burgeoning
field of collective intention. Part III.A provides a general overview of
the approaches used by scholars in this area; Parts III.B-D explores the
62

Id. at 262.
Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561
(1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993)).
64
Id. at 1595.
65
Although I use Searle’s term of collective intention, see John R. Searle, Collective
Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 401, 401 (Philip R. Cohen et
al. eds., 1990), I do so neutrally.
66
Frederick F. Schmitt, Socializing Metaphysics: An Introduction, in SOCIALIZING
METAPHYSICS: THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REALITY 1, 1 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003);
see also, e.g., Christopher Kutz, The Collective Work of Citizenship, 8 LEGAL THEORY 471,
472 (2002) (“Clearly, liberal theory’s dependence on an individualistic conception of
agency comes at the cost of significant distortion of the actual framework of social life,
which is so often essentially collective.”).
63
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work of Raimo Tuomela, Margaret Gilbert, and Philip Pettit, respectively.
A. An Overview of Collective Intention
The study of collective intention is the study of whether and how
67
groups form intentions.
While what it means for an individual to
have an intention may not itself be free from controversy, the subject
becomes even more fraught with difficulty when groups of individuals
are considered. Clearly, speakers of English speak as if groups are entities capable of intentions and actions. For example, it is perfectly
natural to speak of a club planning an event or a company designing a
new product. Although both describe situations which require more
than one individual to perform separate actions, it seems quite felicitous to speak of the organization as working as a unit toward a collective goal.
In providing an overview of theories of collective intention, the
first distinction to be made is between individualist accounts of collective intention and nonindividualist, or holistic, accounts. While it is
virtually undisputed that the actions of individuals determine the existence and nature of social collectivities (social groups supervene on an
68
individual’s actions), the dispute over individualism centers on
69
whether group intentions can be reduced to individual intentions.
When an individual claims that a group intends to do something, does
this just mean that each individual within the group has the proper
intention?
Individualist accounts, such as Seumas Miller’s account, describe
joint action as the sum of individual actions “directed to the realisa70
tion of a collective end.” The collective end must also be each indi-

67

For a good exposition of the literature, see Schmitt, supra note 66, at 1-37, and
MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT
THEORY 154-61 (2000).
68
See Schmitt, supra note 66, at 2 (“[S]ocial relations and collectivities are determined by individuals and their nonsocial properties [in that] social relations and collectivities supervene on nonsocial properties of individuals.”).
69
An eliminative individualist, however, would deny the existence of social groups
entirely. See id. at 6-7 (describing the theory of eliminative ontological individualsm).
Schmitt’s own theory of group intention is eliminativist; he concludes that joint action
requires a supraindividualist account (that groups are themselves intentional subjects
on par with individuals) which, in turn, prohibits the existence of any such groups.
Frederick F. Schmitt, Joint Action: From Individualism to Supraindividualism, in
SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS, supra note 66, at 129, 156.
70
SEUMAS MILLER, SOCIAL ACTION: A TELEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 57 (2001).

998

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 983

71

vidual’s desired outcome. In addition to the actions performed by
each individual, the participants in the joint actions must hold certain
72
beliefs about the other participant’s actions.
Michael Bratman holds a similar view, which is “broadly individu73
alistic in spirit.” Bratman begins his discussion of shared intention
with the observation that a shared intention requires more than two
74
individuals with identical intentions.
If you and I both intend to
paint the house independently of the other’s actions or intentions, we
cannot properly be said to have a shared intention. Shared intention
is “a state of affairs consisting primarily of appropriate attitudes of
75
each individual participant and their interrelations,” in which each
individual holds an intention that the group behave in a certain way
76
coupled with the appropriate reflexivity of belief. This state of affairs allows the coordinated activity and planning that characterizes a
77
social group. For Bratman, the shared intention is not an attitude; it
is a state of affairs.
In Bratman’s view, a shared intention means that I intend that we J.
78
But how can “I intend our activity?” The difficulty is that two individuals must come jointly to intend something where both seemingly
have the exclusive power to settle the collective course of action.
79
Bratman responds by recognizing a kind of “temporal asymmetry”
wherein, for example, I form the intention that we J on the assumption that this will cause you to also come to intend that we J. “[Y]ou
and I each might arrive at intentions that we J as part of a web of in80
tentions . . . .” I realize that you are free to not intend that we J, but
predict that you will and base my intention on that prediction. Thus,

71

Id. at 57-58.
See id. at 59 (“[C]ollective ends include mutual true belief.”).
73
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION
AND AGENCY 129 (1999).
74
Id. at 110-11.
75
Id. at 111.
76
Note that Bratman does not claim that his conditions are necessary for all types
of shared intention, but that this is a coherent view. See id. at 160 (“[M]y concern here
[has been] . . . to defend the coherence of [my] conditions as at least constituting an
important kind of shared intention.”).
77
See id. at 140 (describing “a social-psychological web of interlocking attitudes” as
part of a strategy to defend the shared intention thesis).
78
Id. at 145.
79
Id. at 157.
80
Id. (italics added).
72
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81

the shared intention is “up to each of us.” Finally, Bratman posits a
82
special kind of group activity called “shared cooperative activity.”
Unlike Miller and Bratman, both of whom are clearly individualists, Raimo Tuomela’s work is less clearly individualistic. While Mar83
garet Gilbert ascribes an individualistic account to Raimo Tuomela,
Frederick Schmitt argues that Tuomela’s “we-mode” is not reducible
84
to individual attitudes. Tuomela seems to accept, however, the idea
85
that phenomena can be explained in individualistic terms and as86
cribes to an ontological individualism. Regardless, his “conceptual
framework . . . is compatible with doctrines postulating the existence
87
of social wholes.”
The second set of collective intention theories can be characterized as nonindividualist. For these philosophers, “[c]ollective intentional behavior is a primitive phenomenon that cannot be analyzed as
88
just the summation of individual intentional behavior.” John Searle
and Margaret Gilbert are two proponents of nonindividualism. As an
example, Searle contrasts two situations: one in which a person is
running towards a shelter in a park to avoid a sudden rainstorm; the
other in which a person is running towards the same point as part of
an outdoor ballet. From an external point of view, both actions may
89
appear identical. In the first case, “it seems no set of intends, even
supplemented with beliefs about other I intends, is sufficient to get to
90
the we intend.” Furthermore, in the second case, the I intend is derivative from the we intend; individual intentions derived from collective intentions may have different content from the collective inten-

81

Id.
Id. at 106. Bratman describes the features of shared cooperative action as including mutual responsiveness (of both intention and action), commitment to the
joint activity, and commitment to mutual support. Id. at 94-95. He also notes that
shared cooperative action is “cooperatively neutral” in that “joint performance of an
act . . . may be cooperative, but it need not be.” Id. at 96-97. Examples of cooperative
acts include painting a house or shoveling snow from a sidewalk, as opposed to participating in a competitive endeavor such as chess.
83
GILBERT, supra note 67, at 159.
84
Schmitt, supra note 66, at 14.
85
See TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 361-63 (discussing conceptual individualism).
86
See id. at 367 (“While I accept the ‘intentional existence’ of social wholes, viz.,
that concepts of social wholes can and do exist in people’s thoughts, they have no real
existence, viz., existence outside the realm of thoughts.”).
87
Id. at 376.
88
Searle, supra note 65, at 401.
89
Id. at 403.
90
Id. (italics added).
82
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tion. We-intentions, for Searle, contain a notion of cooperation and,
while residing solely in the mind of the individual, make reference to
the collective. The individual will have the intention: “I am doing act
93
B as part of our doing act A.”
Similarly, Gilbert’s account invokes the notion of a “joint commitment” that “is not a conjunction of the personal commitments of
94
the various parties but the commitment of all.” Furthermore, she
argues that “people share an intention if and only if they are jointly
95
committed to espouse a certain intention as a body.”
A further distinction can be made between internally and exter96
nally holistic (or nonindividualist) theories. An internal holist’s account of shared or collective intention requires only that the participants in the action see the action as being an action of the group of
97
which they are a member. Gilbert, in contrast, is an external holist
because her account “irreducibly ascribes” the action in question to a
98
group of individuals. To form a plural subject properly, individuals
must jointly intend; it is not enough that each individual believe she is
acting collectively or possess an intention collectively.
Unlike Gilbert, Searle is an internal holist; under his account it is
99
the participants who ascribe the action to the group. In contrast to
Bratman’s individualist theory, Searle’s theory is not an account of a
state of affairs; it is an account of a certain kind of intention that an
individual mind possesses. What allows us to have collective intentions is a background belief that other individuals are like ourselves
and have a similar awareness of our agent status and that we view each
100
other as possible collective agents. Thus, in contrast to Gilbert’s external holist view (and Bratman’s individualist view), Searle’s account
will hold “even if [the participant is] a brain in a vat” and completely
91

Id. For example, the collective intention may be to bake a cake, but the individual, derivative intention may be that I will crack the eggs and put them into the batter.
92
See id. at 406 (“The notion of a we-intention, of collective intentionality, implies
the notion of cooperation.”).
93
Id. at 407.
94
GILBERT, supra note 67, at 158.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 157.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 157-58.
99
See Searle, supra note 65, at 402-03 (describing how actions take on a new character based on an individual’s perceptions).
100
See id. at 414 (“Collective intentionality . . . presupposes a sense of others as
more than mere conscious agents . . . .”).

2006]

1001

COLLECTIVE INTENTION
101

mistaken as to whether the collective intention is shared.
In such a
case, not only will an individual hold a mistaken belief about the collective intention, but she will also be mistaken as to what she is do102
ing.
The final variety of collective intention is supraindividualism.
Philip Pettit advocates a kind of supraindividualism for “certain collectivities . . . [which are] subjects in their own right, giving them a way of
being minded that is starkly discontinuous with the mentality of their
103
members.”
Pettit’s account does not conflict with the requirement
that collectivities must supervene on individual actions; it merely says
that once certain collectivities come into existence, they “assume a life
of their own . . . displaying all the qualities expected in personal
104
agents.”
Most philosophers of collective intention have focused primarily
105
on small groups, often with just two members.
I now go on to describe in more detail the work of the three philosophers who most
clearly address the intricacies of structured social groups and whose
work holds the most potential to be fruitfully applied to Congress:
Raimo Tuomela, Margaret Gilbert, and Philip Pettit. Because of the
particular complexities that Congress poses for these theories, this
Part highlights the work of philosophers of collective intention who
have focused on the intention forming of larger groups.
B. Raimo Tuomela
Tuomela’s account of collective intention makes a fundamental
“distinction between the notions of having an attitude or acting as a
106
group member versus as a private person.” These he calls the “we-mode”
107
and the “I-mode.”
The notion of joint intention, for Tuomela, requires the “we-mode” and “we-intentions.” Tuomela defines we101

Id. at 407, 414.
Id. at 408.
103
Philip Pettit, Groups with Minds of Their Own, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS, supra
note 66, at 167, 167.
104
Id. at 191.
105
See ANNETTE C. BAIER, THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 26 (1997) (“Yet when recent philosophers such as John Searle and Michael Bratman have turned their attention to collective intention and collective action, they have chosen pairs of persons,
and so have seen the collective intention as no more than the coordination of two individuals’ intentions.”).
106
Raimo Tuomela, The We-Mode and the I-Mode, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS, supra note 66, at 93, 93.
107
Id.
102
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intentions thus: “A we-intends to bring about X [if and only if] A
shares the (agreement-based) intention to bring about X and believes
that this intention to bring about X is shared in G and believes that it
108
is mutually believed that this intention is shared in G . . . .”
A more
recent formulation introduces the idea of the group’s “collective acceptance” of the intention in place of the mutual belief: “[I]f a group
collectively accepts something as its view, it binds itself to this view and
109
this involves a kind of group pressure . . . .”
Furthermore, this formulation of the central we-mode requires that an individual is functioning as a group member and is committed to the action at least in
110
part because of the group. To function as a group member is to “intentionally attempt to act in a way related to . . . the group’s realm of
concern such that [it] does not violate the group’s central, constitu111
tive goals, beliefs, standards, and norms . . . .”
112
Joint intentions, for Tuomela in The Importance of Us, require the
113
making of an agreement.
This agreement need not be a recurring
agreement. Tuomela argues that “especially in institutionalized social
settings . . . there can be standing joint intentions (policies) which are
activated in suitable circumstances but which do not presuppose re114
newed intention-formation or renewed agreement-making.”
These
“standing joint intentions” rely on social norms which participants enter into when they join the institution in question.
Building on this relaxed notion of agreement, Tuomela further
refines his definition of a we-intention. Tuomela discusses types of
joint action, including “noncooperative joint action” where partici115
pants cooperate only in so much as they fulfill their agreement.
The participants do not help the other participants move fully towards
their goals; rather, the “agents act on their part-related preferences
116
(utilities) built into the structure of the action.”

108

TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 38 (italics added).
Tuomela, supra note 106, at 103.
110
Id. at 104.
111
Id. at 100.
112
The book is a highly complex and intricate work, which I have attempted to
summarize (and simplify) here. For a more recent exploration of these issues, see
RAIMO TUOMELA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL PRACTICES: A COLLECTIVE ACCEPTANCE
VIEW (2002).
113
TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 74.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 149.
116
Id.
109
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Finally, Tuomela discusses the idea of group goals, which in turn
117
amount to group intentions.
Understanding group intentions requires separating “operative” from “nonoperative” members of a
group. Operative members are those members whose actions lead to
group action or those whose actions set the intentions for the
118
group.
Tuomela gives the example of a state which intends to form a
peace treaty. The appropriate collective members may draft the treaty
and sign it; these are the operative members. While most citizens
have done nothing to directly participate, the state can act as a collective whole if the citizens were in some way obliged to accept the offi119
cials acting on their behalf.
“The nonoperative members may disagree with the goal formed for G, but typically they can still be
assumed to conform to what the operative members do, and in this
sense to ‘tacitly’ or ‘weakly’ accept their joint goals as valid goals of
120
G.”
According to Tuomela, there is at least a prima facie duty on
the part of the nonoperative members to accept these goals when they
are acting within a structured social group where the operative mem121
bers are acting within the relevant authority system.
This formulation is “compatible with there being nonoperative members who even
qua members of G disagree with the . . . goals of the operational
122
members.”
C. Margaret Gilbert
As described in Part A, Margaret Gilbert can be characterized as
123
an external holist.
Gilbert proposes three criteria of adequacy for a
117

Id. at 285.
Id. at 273-74.
119
Id. It is debatable, of course, whether citizens would be obliged to accept the
decision. See generally Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611 (1991)
(examining the foundations of legal authority). Note also that operative members vary
from group task to group task. TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 274.
120
TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 276 (italics added).
121
Id. at 281.
122
Id (italics added).
123
It seems that Gilbert sees her task as primarily conceptual. See Margaret Gilbert, What Is It for Us To Intend?, in 2 CONTEMPORARY ACTION THEORY 65, 66 (Ghita
Holmstrom-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela eds., 1997) (“What is it for us to share an intention? In this essay I propose an answer to this question. I take the question to call
for an analysis of the everyday concept of a shared intention.”). At points, she appears
to be making ontological claims: “people form a plural subject of X-ing if they are
jointly committed to X as a body.” GILBERT, supra note 67, at 158. As Gilbert writes in
On Social Facts, “[g]iven that it is clear what plural subjects amount to, one can decide
118
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shared intention: obligation, the view that whenever one understands
a shared intention to exist, one also understands an obligation to fulfill one’s end; permission, the view that a participant in a shared intention is understood to require the permission of the other to
change the plan; and “compatibility with lack of the corresponding
personal intentions,” which is the view that a shared intention does
124
not require a matching personal intention.
A shared intention, for Gilbert, requires a plural subject that
comes into being when individuals are jointly committed to performing some action as a body. For shared intention, this means that the
125
individuals are jointly committed to intending as a body.
Intending
as a body is “all acting in such a way as to constitute a body that” in126
tends.
Joint commitment means a commitment of two or more people; a joint commitment is not the sum of two personal commitments,
but a holistic commitment held by two or more people that results in
127
dependent individual commitments.
A joint commitment comes
into being when the participants exhibit “matching expressions of per128
The shared insonal readiness to enter a particular joint commitment.”
tention provides a single motivating force for all the individuals, and,
129
thus, personal intentions would be redundant.
In On Social Facts, Gilbert notes that for some actions and types of
groups (for example, one country invading another) certain representatives can “speak for” the entire group. This works when “members
of the group jointly accept that certain decisions of a certain few are
130
to count as our decisions.”
Furthermore, Gilbert discusses how a
group can jointly accept a particular principle, while individuals may
still diverge in their personal views:

on their reality in the light of one’s own ontological preferences.” MARGARET
GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 432 (1989). After giving the example of seeing two people
chatting and claiming they are a plural subject:
I take it that they have . . . the concept of a plural subject. Why should one
deny of them that once they have fulfilled the conditions, they constitute such
a subject? The only reason I can see, is if one has an ontology which is more
or less restricted to stones.
Id. at 433.
124
Gilbert, supra note 123, at 67-69.
125
Id. at 71-72.
126
GILBERT, supra note 67, at 54.
127
Margaret Gilbert, The Structure of the Social Atom, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS,
supra note 66, at 39, 49-50; see also GILBERT, supra note 67, at 53.
128
Gilbert, supra note 127, at 54.
129
Gilbert, supra note 123, at 77-78.
130
GILBERT, supra note 123, at 206 (internal reference omitted).
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One is required to express the jointly accepted view only in the appropriate circumstances. . . .
. . . [O]ne may be able to carry out the obligations inherent in one’s
joint acceptance of a principle while not only personally endorsing a
contrary principle, but actually conforming to a personal principle at
certain times. 131

Under this view, then, the joint commitment to act or believe in a
certain way is not undermined by contrary personal views, as long as
the individual has jointly accepted the view.
D. Philip Pettit
In some ways, Pettit’s account of shared intention can be seen as
the most extreme. He argues that certain collectivities “assume a life
of their own . . . displaying all the qualities expected in personal
132
agents.”
This view may be described as ontological supraindividual133
ism.
Pettit begins his article by discussing a paradox that can arise
134
in group decision making.
Most such decisions are conclusioncentered in that individual votes are taken on the final result; however, it may be the case that counting each individual’s vote on each
portion of the decision (acting premise-centered) will lead to a differ135
ent result.
Pettit also describes a diachronic version of the problem
where a group must decide whether to base their decision on the cur136
rent issue or on premises culled from their prior decisions. As Pettit
views it, groups face a choice: they may respond to individual views,
running the risk of being inconsistent over time, or they may choose
to reason as a collective “even where that means compromising re137
sponsiveness to the views of individual members.”

131

Id. at 375.
Pettit, supra note 103, at 191.
133
See Schmitt, supra note 66, at 15 (describing ontological supraindividualism as
“the view that the entities that we are talking about when we speak of groups . . . in fact
exist”).
134
Pettit, supra note 103, at 168-72.
135
For example, Pettit describes a tort action decided by three judges. While only
one judge might find both causation and duty of care (and, therefore, liability), a majority of the judges might believe the defendant’s actions caused the harm and a majority might also believe there was a duty of care. Id. at 168. Pettit bases this example
on the argument in Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82, 115 (1986).
136
Pettit, supra note 103, at 172-73.
137
Philip Pettit, Collective Persons and Powers, 8 LEGAL THEORY 443, 450 (2002).
132
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“[P]urposive groups,” as Pettit describes them, are groups that
“coordinate their actions around the pursuit of a common purpose”
and these groups will have to make decisions about how they are to
138
act.
Over the course of its existence, a group or organization will
make decisions about courses of action and will build up a record of
such decisions. These past decisions will constrain the future actions
of the group; the group will eventually confront the dilemma described above: they will have to decide whether to act consistently
139
with their past decisions. Many organized groups will choose to conform with past decisions in order to project an image of consistency.
These groups “that collectivize reason,” he argues, “deserve ontologi140
cal recognition as intentional and personal subjects.”
Pettit calls
141
these social integrates.
According to Pettit, social integrates can be considered intentional subjects because they “display all the functional marks of an in142
tentional subject.” The group will “generally act in a manner that is
rationalized by independently discernible representations and
goals . . . . [I]t will display the degree of constancy as well as the de143
gree of coherence that we expect in any intentional subject.”
Pettit
goes on to claim that social integrates are institutional persons capable
144
of being held to task for inconsistency in judgments and intentions.
Having summarized the most influential thinkers and accounts in
collective intention, I now turn to how their accounts may be fruitfully
applied to the social group in question: Congress. I first examine the
nature of Congress as a social group and which, if any, of the above
accounts allow us to infer shared intentions on the part of Congress.
Section IV.F then considers the limits of these inferences in terms of
the scope of mental states attributable to Congress.

138

Pettit, supra note 103, at 176.
Id.
140
Id. at 175.
141
Id. at 178.
142
Id. at 182. Note that Pettit’s account does not address the nature, if any, of the
shared intention or subjecthood of a group which fails to meet his criteria for social
integrate.
143
Id. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 135, at 116-17, for a discussion of consistency versus coherence.
144
Pettit, supra note 103, at 185.
139
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IV. CONGRESS AND COLLECTIVE INTENTION
145

Congress as a social group poses particular problems for a theory of collective intention. Because it is beyond the scope of this
Comment to argue effectively for or against one of the approaches to
collective intention described in Part III on a rigorous philosophical
146
basis, my argument here is the more limited one: that despite Congress’s complexity, a theory of Congress as an intentional entity is
plausible using at least one account of collective intention. First, I review several prior attempts in the legal literature to defend legislative
intent using theories of collective intention. Then, I put forth my
positive argument for why legislative intent is possible: why Congress
147
can be said to be an entity with intentions.
A. Previous Defenses of Legislative Intent
Lawrence Solan, in Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role
of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, argues effectively that
speaking of legislative intent is a coherent and virtually unavoidable
148
thing for judges to do.
Even in a case where almost no legislator
had an intention toward the legislation that was passed, a “judge’s remark [about the intent of the legislature] is both natural and coher149
ent.”
This reference is unavoidable because, Solan argues, the
group adopts the statements of a subgroup, be it a committee or a
150
Members of Congress can have difgroup of members of Congress.
ferent reasons for supporting the bill as long as they recognize that
those who developed the legislation had appropriate plans for the

145

I assume that Congress forms a social group. See Solan, supra note 27, at
438-39, for an interesting discussion of how we form perceptions of individuals as
groups.
146
Note, for example, the stringent criticism that supervenience without reducibility has evoked in philosophy of mind. See Jaegwon Kim, The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism, in THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM 242, 250-53 (Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka
eds., 1994) (“[S]upervenience is not going to deliver to us a viable form of nonreductive materialism . . . .”). An analogous criticism for collective intention would preclude
any nonindividualist account.
147
This argument leaves open two possibilities, which this Comment does not resolve: 1) Congress’s intent may be unknowable for pragmatic reasons in many cases,
and 2) while Congress’s intent does exist, it may be irrelevant for statutory interpretation.
148
See Solan, supra note 27, at 444-47, for examples of justifications of legislative
intent.
149
Id. at 445.
150
Id. at 447.
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151

bill.
“All of this means that when judges speak of legislative intent,
and attribute reasons to the legislature as though it were a single individual with a mind of its own, they are simply doing what we all do
152
when we talk about deliberative groups.” Furthermore, once we begin to treat collective entities as individuals, we will attribute the trait
of volition to those entities. It is “common and coherent to understand plural subjects as having beliefs, intentions, and other states of
153
mind.”
Solan has presented a convincing conceptual account. Surely it is
true that we (including judges) speak as though Congress were a sin154
gular entity capable of intentions, and most of us believe that these
statements are accurate. Even textualist judges refer to the intent of
Congress on occasion, thus recognizing, to some extent, that Congress
155
must be an entity with collective intentions.
The problem, as I see it, is that under this account (and in this regard the account is similar to Gilbert’s) the recognition of collective
entities may in some cases be wrong. Even though a certain account
of group behavior motivates the use of we, does that mean that all felicitous uses of we allow all the same inferences or are there finer distinctions to be made among different types of groups? Even if we are
satisfied with a purely conceptual account (or we believe a conceptual
account is an ontological account), is it possible that we assume Congress has certain properties making it justifiably conceived of as a plural subject, when it really does not? In order to justify inferences from
the actions of Congress, one must first outline the difficulties the nature of Congress poses to an account of collective intention and see if
any account of collective intention can support looking to legislative
intent. If so, what kind of inferences can be justified? Is Congress actually enough like an individual (or an undisputed we-subject) to infer
intentions about the words of a statute? What about inferring purposes and desires?
Other legal scholars have used the philosophy of collective intention. For example, Anderson and Pildes, in Expressive Theories of Law:

151

Id.
Id. at 449; see also id. at 449-53 (reviewing the psychological literature explaining why and how we come to attribute states of mind to groups).
153
Id. at 453.
154
See, e.g., John Breaux, Congress Is at War with Itself!, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 7,
2004, at C1 (illustrating the personification of Congress).
155
See Solan, supra note 27, at 38-44 (demonstrating that even textualists rely on
the language of intent in their opinions).
152
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A General Restatement, use the work of Margaret Gilbert to justify collective intention; however, they do not apply the theory directly to Con156
gress.
Sinclair, in Legislative Intent: Fact or Fabrication?, criticizes
Eskridge and seems to side with a nonindividualist account of collec157
tive intention.
Finally, Professor Tiefer uses the work of Austin and
158
Searle to account for collective intention.
While each of these articles presents interesting analyses of part of the literature, I would like
to present a broader, more rigorous comparison of the theories of collective intent and their application to Congress.
B. What Is Unique About Congress?
Given that at least one account of collective intention is plausible,
there are at least some circumstances under which one can accurately
speak of shared intentions. What is it about Congress that makes it
such a challenging case? First, Congress has unique characteristics as
a social group: it has hundreds of members, divided into two houses,
159
both of which must approve legislation.
While only legislators can
introduce bills, the bills are often drafted in substantial part by the ex160
Most bills
ecutive branch or private individuals or organizations.
are then referred to smaller committees in the House of Representa161
tives or the Senate and then reported from the committee.
These
committees have a great deal of control over what legislation reaches
162
the floor.
If the bill does not die in committee, a report is sent to the full
legislative chamber; the committee report contains the background of
163
the bill, the bill’s exact language, and an analysis of the bill.
“Com-

156

Anderson & Pildes, supra note 28, at 1514-24.
Sinclair, supra note 28, at 1351-57. Note that Sinclair does, at one point, cite
Bratman. Id. at 1354.
158
Tiefer, supra note 28, at 259-64.
159
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 24 (3d ed. 2001) (describing Congress’s bicameralism and presentment requirements and their effects on the legislative
process).
160
Id. at 26.
161
See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 15 (2d ed. 2000) (stating
that in the 104th and 105th Congresses only one in ten bills in the House of Representatives bypassed a committee); id. at 37 (stating that for the 104th Congress, only one
in four bills bypassed the Senate committee stage).
162
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 28 (“No more than one in ten bills becomes law, and most of the unsuccessful proposals are killed in committee.”).
163
Id. at 30.
157
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mittee reports . . . are frequently the only documents that most legisla164
tors and their staffs will read before a vote is taken on the bill.” Following the report, informal “postcommittee adjustments” are often
165
made.
Once the report is issued, the bill is placed on a legislative calen166
dar.
Once the bill is on the agenda, floor consideration occurs.
While “[f]ew votes appear to be altered by floor debate,” floor consideration also includes the process of amending the bill, which can be
167
quite intense for major legislation.
The amendment process is fre168
quently governed in the House by special rules, which can also modify the order in which bills are presented and the time allowed for de169
bate.
These rules can be used to “structure the choices members
170
confront on the floor in a way that promotes a particular outcome.”
Similarly, the Senate often operates under “a formal unanimous
171
consent agreement (UCA).”
The UCA limits debate and amendments and may bar nongermane amendments; as the name suggests,
172
After debate and
the support of such a rule must be unanimous.
amendments, members of Congress vote on the bill. The entire process leading up to the vote has become increasingly less “textbook”
and, as Barbara Sinclair describes, more “unorthodox”: “Now variation is the norm . . . if one route is blocked there is always another to
173
try.”
If the House of Representatives and the Senate vote to approve
174
different versions of similar bills, a conference committee is formed.
In practice, members of the original committee appoint members to
175
this conference committee.
Following the conference committee, a
new report is issued that sets forth the propositions agreed to by the
164

Id.
See SINCLAIR, supra note 161, at 17 (“[M]ore than a third of major legislation
[is] subject to such postcommittee adjustments in most recent Congresses . . . .”).
166
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 31.
167
Id. at 33-34.
168
The House and Senate are given this power in the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.”).
169
SINCLAIR, supra note 161, at 21.
170
Id. at 24.
171
Id. at 45.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 34.
174
Id. at 57.
175
Id. at 60.
165
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committees. Both houses then vote to accept or reject the conference
176
bill.
As the reliance on committees both pre- and post-floor consideration suggests, “Congress has a complex and detailed division and
specialization of labor in which each chamber gives disproportionate
177
agenda power to specific subsets of legislators . . . .”
Thus, only certain small groups of legislators have positions of great control over the
content of legislation.
Second, members of Congress vote on legislation for varying reasons, often having little to do with their careful consideration of the
178
issue being legislated.
These members of Congress may not have
formed a personal intention that the legislation pass. In highly controversial cases, many members of Congress vote against the legislation, thereby evincing their personal intention that the legislation not
pass. Furthermore, even members of Congress who vote in favor of
legislation may have a contrary personal intention that the legislation
179
not pass.
Thus for many reasons, members of Congress may not
have a personal intention, based on the substance of the statute, that
the statute be passed. This calls into question whether Congress as a
group can be said to have intentions.
Third, unlike the cooperative participants most often described in
the literature on collective intention, members of Congress may be
openly hostile to one another and seek to undermine the success of
180
other members’ proposed legislation. Furthermore, politically powerful groups in Congress may break Senate or House rules or attach
measures to bills that cannot be thrown out without grave consequences (e.g., an appropriations bill) in order to force their oppo181
nents to vote in favor of the measures.
Finally, Congress’s actions are of a unique type. Congress is not
simply attempting to bake a cake or run a football play or even dance
an outdoor ballet. Congress’s function (at least in the sense relevant

176

Id. at 57. Both chambers must approve bills with identical wording. Id.
Shepsle, supra note 25, at 245.
178
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 16 (identifying reasons legislators vote for bills,
such as to support legislation the President, party leaders, or relevant interest groups
favor).
179
See, e.g., id. (noting that legislators sometimes vote for a bill because others
whom they wish to support favor a bill).
180
See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 34 (describing how members of
Congress can introduce “killer amendments” which appear friendly but are designed
to kill the bill by “antagoniz[ing] the bill’s more moderate supporters”).
181
See, e.g., Edward R. Becker, Of Laws and Sausages, 87 JUDICATURE 7, 9 (2003)
(providing examples of additions to appropriations bills).
177
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here) is as a legislative body: passing, amending, and rescinding statutes. A text is created when Congress passes or amends a statute, but
it is not an ordinary text like a shopping list or essay: the act of passing a statute is a “performative utterance” or “performative speech
182
act,” that is, one which changes the world in some way.
For example, when an employer says “you’re fired,” she has communicated a
message, but has also changed the state of the world. Unless the utterance misfires because she lacks the relevant authority, you are, in
fact, no longer in her employ. The same is true for the passing of
statutes: meaning and action intertwine. Congress’s intent, then, is
what the words convey and that, in turn, changes a state of affairs in
the world. The collective intentions we are concerned with are those
directed at the performative utterance of enacting a statute.
The text that is passed differs from many other kinds of texts for
another reason. In Tiersma’s terms, a statute is a kind of “autono183
mous text.”
The text has been “textualized” by “a legislature . . .
184
empowered to textualize its intentions.”
This textualization “guarantees that the text is not just authoritative, but is the complete expres185
sion of the legal actor’s intent.”
Tiersma writes that “[s]tatutes are,
186
in fact, not unlike messages set adrift in the currents of the ocean,”
because “an autonomous text tends to be written so it can be interpreted without reference to outside sources—in other words, without
additional knowledge of who the writer was, the circumstances, or the
purpose of the writing. All relevant information, to the extent possi187
ble, is contained in the writing itself.”
Members of Congress know
that their statutes are performative acts and that they will be inter182

See DENNIS KURZON, IT IS HEREBY PERFORMED . . .: EXPLORATIONS IN LEGAL
SPEECH ACTS 5-24 (1986) (analyzing statutes as performative speech acts); Tiefer, supra
note 28, at 256-57 (discussing Austin’s analysis of speech that has an operative effect).
For a description of performatives, see generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS
WITH WORDS 1-11 (1962); GENNARO CHIERCHIA & SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, MEANING
AND GRAMMAR 220-39 (2d ed. 2000); John R. Searle, How Performatives Work, in ESSAYS
IN SPEECH ACT THEORY 85, 85-107 (Daniel Vanderveken & Susamu Kubo eds., 2002).
Cf. JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH
ACTS 16-20 (1979) (employing an outdated syntactic analysis).
183
Tiersma, supra note 31, at 482.
184
Peter M. Tiersma, From Speech to Writing: Textualization and Its Consequences, in
LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 349, 360 (Marlyn Robinson ed., 2003).
185
Id. at 359.
186
Tiersma, supra note 27, at 433. Tiersma also includes an interesting history of
how statutes came to be more autonomous, beginning with medieval judges who
commonly had no authentic text available to them and felt free to ask members of parliament what was meant by a statute. Id. at 435-43.
187
Id. at 448.
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preted without access to each legislator’s state of mind at the time of
writing; thus, statutes are textualized in Tiersma’s sense.
C. Is Congress an Institutional Person?
To begin the inquiry into the possibility of collective intent on the
part of Congress, I first begin with the most extreme claim: that Con188
gress is an institutional person in the sense that Pettit describes.
This view does seem to be present in Supreme Court opinions. For
example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court determined that “Congress intended to exclude tobacco products from
the FDA’s jurisdiction,” because if Congress had not so intended, the
189
FDA would be required to ban them from the market.
Congress
had, subsequent to granting jurisdiction to the FDA, demonstrated an
intent to regulate, instead of ban, tobacco products; the forced withdrawal of tobacco products from the market would contradict this in190
tent. Justice O’Connor looked to the statutes Congress had enacted
over a thirty-five -year period and concluded that “a specific policy
embodied in a later federal statute should control our construction of
the [earlier] statute, even though it ha[s] not been expressly
191
amended.”
This approach to understanding statutory interpretation is perfectly reasonable, if one can conceive of Congress as an institutional
person. If I say something today that you take to be unclear, but follow up with a more specific statement tomorrow, you are perfectly justified in seeking to mesh the two statements into one coherent statement because of your expectations about rational individuals. We
expect a certain degree of “constancy” and “coherence” in an inten192
tional subject.
Is this a reasonable expectation for Congress? I
193
Pettit himself wonders whether a “Washington-style conthink not.
188

See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text (describing Pettit’s account of
“purposive groups”).
189
529 U.S. 120, 140 (2000).
190
Id. at 143.
191
Id. at 143 (quoting United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-31
(1998) (alterations in original)).
192
Pettit, supra note 103, at 182.
193
I argue that we cannot legitimately have these expectations of Congress, even if
this might lead to a reasonable, or even the best, outcome in a case. See infra Part IV.F.
Additionally, note that the majority in Brown & Williamson did not rely solely on this
argument. See Brown & Williamson, 524 U.S. at 121 (considering common sense in
“delegat[ing] a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency”).
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194

gress function[s] like a person” and notes that “depending on the
procedures whereby they operate, the members of different organizational bodies in a state—say, a parliament—may or may not constitute
195
institutional persons.”
Remember that Pettit distinguishes between two types of groups:
those that must be maximally responsive to their individual members’
preferences and those that collectivize rationality and seek some con196
sistency.
According to Pettit, a group that chooses to reason as a
collective “will not be an effective or credible promoter of its assumed
purpose if it tolerates inconsistency or incoherence in its judgments
197
across time.”
In contrast to Pettit’s purposive groups, Congress in our represen198
tational democracy is understood to respond maximally to its mem199
200
bers’ views.
In a democracy, legislation is passed by majority vote;
furthermore, representational democracy requires legislators to be responsive to their constituency. A member of Congress should not
choose to support a policy simply because it is consistent with a past
201
policy of a previous Congress.
Congress’s purpose is not undermined by inconsistency over time—legislative enactments may be
overturned or modified as social and political views evolve.
Pettit raises one further possibility for groups like Congress. He
writes that “an occasionally inconsistent parliament may still function
as a person as long as there is a second body—say, a review court—

194

Pettit, supra note 137, at 467.
Id. at 464.
196
Pettit, supra note 103, at 175.
197
Pettit, supra note 137, at 453.
198
Pettit’s argument in favor of institutional persons as centers of governance relies on his republican view of government, which, he claims, “argues strongly in favor
of having institutional persons in charge of political life.” Id. at 464. This Comment
cannot address the merits of republican views of government versus strict democratic
views, but it is enough, I think, to note that our current understanding of Congress
does not fully comport with a republican view: we understand Congress as representing citizens’ views and we recognize citizens’ power to affect policy by electing or removing members of Congress.
199
There are, of course, constitutional and other restrictions on Congress’s actions.
200
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 35 (“The number of votes needed to
adopt an amendment or pass a bill is normally a majority of those voting in each house
of Congress, assuming a quorum is present.”).
201
Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 243-44 (1986) (arguing that while judges
are bound to view law “by a coherent set of principles,” legislatures do not “need reasons of principle to justify the rules it enacts” and are free to “create new rights” as
guided by a pursuit of good policy).
195
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that interprets all legislative acts on the assumption that they are
202
meant to be consistent.”
First, it is arguable that the Court always
treats Congress’s acts in a way that requires consistency. Second,
given that the purpose of this Comment is to determine when and if
the Court is justified in treating Congress as a social group with intentions or purposes, this definition of institutional person is singularly
unhelpful. The argument would run as follows: “the Court treats
Congress as an institutional person; therefore, Congress is an institutional person and the Court is justified in treating it as such.” Thus, it
seems that Congress cannot meet the criteria set out by Pettit for social integrates except in a way that begs the question of this Com203
ment.
D. Is Congress as an Entity Capable of Shared Intentions?
Given that Congress cannot be considered an institutional person,
is it possible, nonetheless, that Congress can be said to have shared intentions? I believe it can. I begin by defending my statement in Part
III.A that the accounts of John R. Searle and Michael Bratman cannot
provide an adequate account of Congress’s intent. The shortcoming
in Searle’s account is that it does not provide the conditions for when
a person external to the group can properly say that a group has a collective intention. Because a brain in a vat could believe itself to have a
collective intention, but be wrong, we need conditions for when a person is right in her beliefs. Does every participant need to have the
requisite collective intention? Do the collective intentions need to be
identical? Although Searle notes that in competitive or aggressive
situations, the participants may only have a higher-order intention to
204
cooperate, he does not in detail describe, how and to what extent,
the participants can be said to share an intent. We must look further
for the answers to these questions.
Although Bratman is an individualist and, therefore, believes that
“I intend that we J” is reducible to individual intentions contra Searle,
a similar problem appears in his analysis. Although it is clear in some
cases that a shared intention exists, it is not clear at what point this
begins to break down. Bratman himself recognizes that he is describ-

202

Pettit, supra note 137, at 468.
I am assuming that a social integrate could exist or is, at the very least, a coherent concept.
204
Searle, supra note 65, at 413-14.
203
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205

ing what may be only one kind of shared intention. If our intending
is dependent on a certain back-and-forth between the individual par206
ticipants, it seems that Congress will have trouble meeting this requirement. Members of Congress who vote against legislation will not
have expressed their conditional assent to our intending to the participants who do so intend. Perhaps certain subgroups of Congress do
fit this description, such that one member forms a we-intention on the
assumption that the other will form one as well, but as a description of
the entirety of Congress, this view is not tenable.
Furthermore, Congress fairly clearly fails Bratman’s description of
full-blown shared cooperative activity. Bratman presents three criteria: “mutual responsiveness,” “commitment to the joint activity,” and
207
“commitment to mutual support.”
Members of Congress are not
generally willing to help all other members of Congress toward a collective goal. In fact, they may be willing to undermine each other’s
efforts to achieve what will become the group’s goals. There may be,
at best, a tacit acceptance of the legislation passed. Bratman notes
that some competitive activity may be something like a shared cooperative activity, but only at a very high, general level. Such an account
could work for Congress, given that there are some rules to which all
members abide and work cooperatively toward. Thus, while Bratman’s account cannot, as it stands, adequately describe Congress, an
account like Bratman’s might be extended to Congress with some ad208
ditions.
205

See BRATMAN, supra note 73, at 160 (acknowledging the possibility of other
forms of shared intention, even where “neither agent, strictly speaking, intends the
shared activity”).
206
See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (describing the web of intentions
formed as part of the “temporal asymmetry” required for joint intentions).
207
BRATMAN, supra note 73, at 94-95. This is simply a different formulation of
SCA described in Part III.A.
208
See Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans, and Practical Reason, 8 LEGAL THEORY 387, 40405 (2002), for an extension of Bratman’s intentional joint activity account to situations
where an individual or an individual acting in a particular capacity has authority over a
group. Shapiro uses this account to argue for legal positivism. Shapiro relaxes many
of Bratman’s requirements to account for large groups with central authority. Id. at
412-13. While this account provides an interesting starting point for understanding
authority in a legal system, it does not seem to readily extend to groups like Congress
where no central authority figure issues “orders” that require another member to
“adopt the content of the order as his or her subplan.” Id. at 406. As Bratman himself
summarizes Shapiro’s account: “We each have intentions that are specifically about
how certain orders of mine are to give you reasons for action.” Michael E. Bratman,
Shapiro on Legal Positivism and Jointly Intentional Activity, 8 LEGAL THEORY 511, 513
(2002). Again, members of Congress do not give each other orders that provide reasons for action.
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Gilbert’s and Tuomela’s accounts are, thus, the most promising.
Both acknowledge the complications of larger organizations and both
recognize that smaller groups of an organization may come to repre209
sent the group’s collective intentions.
One of Gilbert’s primary criteria for a plural subject, and thus shared intention, is that it must be
possible even where personal intentions are not corresponding. Thus,
a member of Congress could have a personal intention quite contrary
to that of the collective intention, without undermining the collective
210
intention as such.
How is it, though, that a member of Congress
comes to accept the will of another for the collective will? What if certain members still disagree that the intention should be accepted?
Remember that Tuomela goes a step further, stating that this formulation is “compatible with there being nonoperative members who even
qua members of G disagree with the . . . goals [intentions] of the op211
erative members.”
While I think that in principle both Gilbert and Tuomela point to
the answer—that there is some higher-level or meta agreement or
joint commitment—only Tuomela discusses the relevant authority system and why nonoperative members must be in some sense obliged to
212
go along in order for it to be a proper collective intention.
I there213
fore present my analysis building off the work of Tuomela.
E. A Tuomelaic Account
In Part II.C I discussed, for the most part casually, Tuomela’s
claims about group intentions and how a group intention might exist
even in a situation where not all members of a group held the same
intention, even qua group members. I now present a modified version
of Tuomela’s technical requirements for a group intention:
L is an intended legislative act and intended change in the state of the
legal world of Congress (G) in the social and normative circumstances C

209

See GILBERT, supra note 123, at 206 (noting that in situations where not all
group members are directly involved in decision making, the decisions of a few count
as the group’s decision); TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 273-74 (same).
210
See supra notes 178-79 for a description of the circumstances under which
members of Congress can have a contrary personal intention.
211
TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 281 (italics added).
212
Id.
213
Tuomela’s work may also be preferable because, while compatible with nonindividualism, it does not seem to require it. The fewer philosophical commitments, the
better.
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if and only if in C there are operative members A1. . .An of G in respective
positions P1. . .Pn such that:
(1) L is intentionally jointly accepted as an intention of G by the operative agents A1. . .An when performing their social tasks in positions
P1. . .Pn and due to their exercising the relevant authority system of G;
(2) There is a mutual belief among the operative members A1. . .An to
the effect that (1);
(3) Because of (1), the full-fledged nonoperative members of G tend to
tacitly accept–or at least ought to accept–L as the intention of G, as
members of G;
(4) There is a mutual belief in G to the effect that (3).

214

Now we can see how this description fits Congress. When a bill
comes up for vote, certain members of Congress will vote for a bill and
others may vote against it. Only those members of Congress who were
responsible for the bill’s drafting, were members of the committee
that prepared the committee report, or have read the committee report thoroughly (perhaps performing their own research) and accept
it as the group’s intention can be considered “[intention] forming
operative members,” who have “jointly agreed to adopt the [inten215
tion].”
These intent-forming operative members are the members
who must jointly, in the fullest sense, accept the legislation as their
own intent for the group.
There may, of course, be very few operative members. Even if a
member intended to the fullest extent the bill that passed the House
or Senate, a conference committee might later call for changes that
the member only accepts weakly for fear of killing the legislation altogether. Operative members, therefore, will most often be members of
the relevant committees or subcommittees, or members of the conference committee.
In addition to fully operative members, there are “seminonoperative” members who vote for the bill, but do not play as central a role in the legislative process as a committee member might.
These members can be seen as more than tacitly accepting the intentions of those who formed the bill. These members sign onto the bill
and, thus, think it is the proper legislation for Congress to pass for
whatever reason.

214
215

This is drawn from TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 276.
Id. at 275.
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Finally, there are the nonoperative members who voted against
the legislation. For the legislation to be a group intention under
Tuomela’s formulation, these members need only tacitly accept the
legislation as Congress’s intent. Tacit acceptance means simply that
“[a] nonoperative member . . . [not] strongly overtly oppose the [intentions] accepted by the operative members, the penalty for disobey216
ing being at least criticizability.”
Thus, while members of Congress
may stridently disagree with a piece of legislation as it appears in its
enacted form, it is outside the bounds of Congress’s structure for a
member, for example, to forcibly attempt to stop the enactment of a
piece of legislation (burning every copy of the bill, destroying any
computer files, etc.).
Even while disagreeing, a member of Congress is still functioning
qua group member. The member must still “intentionally . . . act in a
way related [to] . . . the group’s realm of concern such that . . . she
does not violate the group’s central, constitutive goals, beliefs, stan217
dards, and norms.”
Part of being a member of Congress requires
adopting the group’s norms and authority structure and agreeing to
tacitly accept any properly enacted legislation.
The operative and nonoperative members shift from bill to bill
and from moment to moment throughout the bill’s journey from in218
troduction to conference committee, as Tuomela recognizes. There
may, of course, be some members of Congress who are most frequently operative members and some who are consistently nonoperative members because of the political make-up of the current Congress. The key point is that when an individual becomes a member of
Congress, she accepts the “realm of concern” and relevant authority
structure of Congress. She accepts that committees will often have a
great deal of control over the success and final content of bills and
that a majority vote will be required for a bill to pass, regardless of
which side she is on. She agrees to accept as group intent (that is, the
intent of Congress) legislation that is properly enacted given the rules

216

Id. at 282.
TUOMELA, supra note 106, at 100.
218
See TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 274 (noting that the identity of operative and
nonoperative members can change between tasks). Note that those voting against the
legislation might have jointly accepted a group intention that, because of the structure
of Congress, the nonoperative members with respect to that intention have no obligation to accept (because it was not authorized by vote). Thus, the status of an operative
member with respect to the legislation is determined once the legislation has been
passed.
217
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and procedures of Congress, including such intricate rules as the
House’s special rules and the Senate’s UCAs.
Thus, a member of Congress has a prima facie duty to accept
219
these group intentions (at least in the weak sense) as long as she is a
part of Congress; this is central to the long-term functioning of Con220
gress and consistent with the structure of Congress as given by Article I: the House and Senate set their own rules and discipline their
221
members.
A member of Congress has agreed to this duty, in the
sense of accepting a “standing joint intention[] (polic[y]) which [is]
activated in suitable circumstances but which do[es] not presuppose
222
renewed intention-formation or renewed agreement-making.”
The minority members of Congress have agreed ahead of time to
“give up their will with respect to group-binding group-[intention]
223
formation and transfer that right to the operative members.”
Congress is, then, a type of “noncooperative joint action” where partici224
pants cooperate only in so much as they fulfill their agreement.
Members of Congress do not necessarily help the other members
more fully realize their personal goals; rather, the “agents act on their
225
part-related preferences (utilities).”
Finally, there are important limitations to this account; for example, for a group intention to exist, the operative members must have
been acting according to the larger structure and authorization of
Congress, such that their actions oblige a nonoperative member to
tacitly accept the group’s intentions. Consider the case of a disagreement over the temperature in the Senate chambers. It may be the
case that a special committee has been assigned the task of regulating
the temperature or a vote might be taken. While the operative members in this case may have the power to change the temperature, I do
not think the nonoperative members are in any way obliged to tacitly
accept this as a group intention because it is not closely tied to Con-

219

Note that the duty is to accept them as group intentions, not private intentions.
See id. at 281 (distinguishing between group intentions accepted because of a duty arising out of group membership and any personal intentions group members may form).
220
See id. (describing group members’ acceptance of group intentions as essential
to the integrity of the group).
221
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member.”).
222
TUOMELA, supra note 2, at 74.
223
Id. at 279.
224
See id. at 149 (describing noncooperative joint action).
225
Id.
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226

gress’s “realm of concern” and the agreements a member of Congress makes upon joining Congress. It is probably unjustified then to
say that “Congress intended the temperature to be set at seventy degrees.”
Thus, I conclude that Raimo Tuomela’s account, as taken primar227
ily from The Importance of Us, can justify understanding Congress as a
collective entity with group intentions, despite the unique challenges
that Congress poses to such an account. A member of Congress
agrees upon entering Congress that certain members will become operative members depending on the bill in question. Once that bill is
passed, even nonoperative members have an obligation to accept, at
least weakly, that intention as the group’s intention because of the
relevant authority structure of Congress. Therefore, under Tuomela’s
account, Congress can properly be said to have an intention with respect to a particular piece of legislation.
F. The Limits of Collective Intention for Congress
At this point it may seem tempting to declare the problem solved
228
and allow all evidence of Congress’s intents, wishes, and purposes
into judges’ reasoning. I think, however, that such a plan would be
unwarranted given the limited ways in which Congress functions as a
collective entity with collective intentions. As demonstrated above,
Congress can only be said to have a group or shared intention to the
extent that, and on such matters as, the nonoperative members have
some obligation to at least weakly accept the operative members’
jointly accepted intention. What can be said about legislative pur229
pose?
I think that the use of “Congress’s purpose” in statutory interpretation is not justified by the nature of Congress and the relationship
among its members. As discussed above, the use of legislative purpose
is very attractive in cases where the language of the statute supplemented by its context is still inadequate to determine a difficult case.
Thus, I think and hope other, external justifications may be found for
reconstructing a likely purpose of Congress or what Congress might

226

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
TUOMELA, supra note 2.
228
Properly authenticated, subject to whatever restrictions one might devise for
the authenticity and weight of evidence of Congress’s intents or purposes.
229
See supra note 42 and accompanying text for my definition of legislative purpose. Note also that I mean legislative purpose that is not codified in a statute.
227
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have had as its purpose were it an individual or a more tightly knit organization. My argument is simply that it should be recognized that
one cannot argue and reason from Congress’s actual purpose because
Congress is not an entity capable of forming purposes or other more
elaborate states of mind. As argued above, it is not an institutional
person and there are, thus, limitations on what can be ascribed to
Congress.
When a member of Congress agrees to at least weakly accept what
operative members decide is going to be a legislative enactment, she is
giving her assent to support, at least somewhat, Congress’s action in
performing a performative speech act. This performative speech act is
known to be a highly autonomous, textualized text, in Tiersma’s
230
sense.
As such, the understanding is that all the intent to the highest degree possible will be contained in the text since textualization
“guarantees that the text is not just authoritative, but is the complete
231
expression of the legal actor’s intent.” No member of Congress can
be said to have agreed to accept, even weakly, the other purposes,
hopes or expectations that were floating around among members of
Congress; thus, Congress as an entity cannot be said to have these
purposes, hopes, or expectations.
Why should one adopt such a minimalist picture of congressional
group structure? As demonstrated ably by Judge Becker, members of
Congress cannot always be counted on to follow even their own
232
rules.
A much more elaborate system of norms than is empirically
verifiable in Congress would be required for Congress to have “purposes.” Given the evidence of only minimal norms, a theory of legislative intent succeeds because it requires only very basic commitments
from each legislator. In contrast, a theory of legislative purpose requires each legislator to assent to the hopes of other legislators—
something that the nature of Congress’s behavior cannot support.
233
Now to return to Hibbs v. Winn.
In Hibbs, as described in Part
234
I.A, Arizona law provided a tax credit for contributions to organiza235
tions awarding scholarships to children attending private schools.
The tax was challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, and the
230

See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
Tiersma, supra note 184, at 359.
232
See Becker, supra note 181 (lamenting that although Congress has many detailed rules in place, such rules are often ignored).
233
542 U.S. 88 (2004).
234
See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
235
Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 92.
231
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state defended by arguing that the TIA barred the taxpayer’s suit in
federal court. The majority analyzed the “legislative purpose” behind
236
the TIA, while the dissent responded with a textualist argument.
Notably, however, the dissent was willing to debate Congress’s purpose, stating that “the TIA’s purpose is not solely to ensure that the
237
State’s fisc is not decreased.”
Thus, my argument is more radical than simply siding with the
dissent’s views on legislative purpose; both sides of the debate refer to
congressional purpose as an extant tool. While the dissent argued
that legislative purpose may never trump the language of the statute,
Justice Kennedy made reference to the purpose of the statute as something in existence. My conclusion would require judges to be more
precise because, as I have argued, legislative purpose qua Congress’s
purpose is not possible given current accounts of collective intention.
Because no member of Congress can be said to have a prima facie
duty to accept the purposes or expectations held by the operative
members of Congress when the legislation in question was enacted,
inferences about the meaning of a statute based on Congress’s purpose are not justified.
CONCLUSION
Despite a close to universal acknowledgment that legislative intent, however narrowly defined, must be used in statutory interpretation, doubts continually resurface about the nature of Congress as an
entity capable of collective intentions. I have argued that there is a
plausible account of Congress’s intent drawn from work in the field of
group collective intention. Such an account of collective intention
must recognize the complex structure of Congress and the special nature of its activities and communicative acts. Such an account can be
found in the work of Raimo Tuomela, as taken primarily from The Im238
portance of Us.
Under Tuomela’s account, to be a member of Congress an individual must agree that when legislation is being written, amended,
and voted on certain members of Congress will become operative
members. Once a bill is passed, even nonoperative members have an
obligation to accept, at least weakly, that text as the group’s intention;
236

See id. at 94, 113 (exemplifying the opposing methods of analysis used by the
majority and the dissent).
237
Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
238
TUOMELA, supra note 2.
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the minority members of Congress have agreed to “give up their will
with respect to group-binding group-[intention] formation and trans239
fer that right to the operative members.”
This account is not defeated even though there are “nonoperative members who even qua
members of [Congress] disagree with the . . . goals of the operative
240
members.”
Therefore, under Tuomela’s account, Congress can
properly be said to have an intention with respect to a particular piece
of legislation.
I have further argued that while legislative purpose is a natural
tool for determining the scope of statutes, analyses using “legislative
purpose” must be justified by reasons extrinsic to the legislative process and any inferences that might be drawn therefrom. Because Congress’s status as a complex social group and as an entity communicating via performative speech acts does not justify conclusions regarding
its “purpose,” such statutory analyses are mischaracterized.
As demonstrated through the analysis of Hibbs, courts may find it
difficult to adopt my argument because reasoning using legislative
purpose is deeply entrenched. My argument, however, is not that the
content of these arguments is necessarily flawed, just that they are mislabeled. One cannot argue and reason from Congress’s actual purpose because Congress is not an entity capable of forming purposes or
other more elaborate states of mind. Congress’s existence as a collective entity depends crucially on the hierarchy of its social organization
and on the particular kinds of actions that Congress can take. In its
legislative function, Congress enacts statutes; therefore, any inferences
drawn from Congress’s behavior or members’ statements must be
connected to this particular action. Members of Congress agree to
group intentions only insofar as these are tied to Congress’s relevant
agreed-upon function: enacting legislation, a performative speech act
creating autonomous texts.

239
240

Id. at 279.
Id. at 281.

